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INTRODUCTION 
When  President  GISCARD  d'ESTAING  was 
Finance Minister  in 1973,  he is quoted  as  saying  ''The problem 
. 
"of money  had  been treated  as a  matter  for  the  experts  and formed 
"the subject  of plans  that were a  delectable  blend  of  sophistication 
11and obscurity.  Now  it has become  a  problem for Governments 
"and is even being  debated  by  Statesmen.  At  stake is  the expansion 
"of international  trade,  that is to say,  the growth.  of the world 
"economy 
11 
At no time in the post war  history  of economic 
events  has there been more  truth in this statement  than today. 
Take the Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government  of the 
European Community  in Bremen,  last  July,  and in Brussels, 
last December.  All these talks  revolved  around the monetary problem. 
And again  at  the Western  Summit in Bonn,  in mid-July last year, 
monetary  issues  were once more the main topic of discussion. 
Whenever  President  CARTER  meets  Chancellor  SCHMIDT  or 
the Japanese Prime  Minister:''{~5'Mems  are  on the agenda. 
(x)  These remarks,  in no way,  commit  the organization to which  the 
author  belongs. \ 
2. 
This is quite normal since the monetary situation 
has an increasing  effect on international trade,  economic  activity  and 
therefore  the material  well-being  of our peoples. 
It is within this political context  that I  wish 
to speak  to you today  of the European Monetary  System. 
In the first  part,  I  would like to situate 
the European moves  within the context of a  world-wide  initiative 
aimed  at bringing  back  some sense of order  into the international 
monetary  system. 
In the second part,  I  shall analyse  with you 
the motives  behind  our  efforts  and the objections which are sometimes 
voiced. 
I.- WORLD-WIDE  CONTEXT 
When we  study  the international  monetary 
system,  the first question we ask  is how can balance of payments 
desequilibria  be avoided,  or,  if they nevertheless  occur, 
how  can either  surpluses  or  deficits  be corrected.  This is what 
is technically  described  as  the  adjustment  process. 
A)  You know  that in the BrettonWoods  system,  which served 
the world economy  very well  for over 2 5  years,  it was essentially 
internal  measures,  monetary  and  budgetary  policies,  which were 
used  to  redress  temporary  balance of payments  deficits. 
When a  country  had a  deficit,  a  stricter  budgetary  and monetary 
policy  was applied.  By thus  reducing  domestic demand, 
goods  became  available  for export,  imports were reduced, 
and  the balance  was  restored.  It was only  in cases of fundamental 
desequilibrium  in its  balance  of payments  that a  country  resorted 
to an external solution,  changing  the official  parity. This system,  as we all know,  deteriora.ted 
mainly  because  the  external  adjustment  was not correctly 
irnplerne nted.  On the one hand  the United  States,  incurred 
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for too long  a  fundamental  deficit  without  devaluing  its currency 
simply  because  financing  was automatically  available. 
This was due to the fact  that the dollar is a  reserve currency. 
At the other  end of the scale,  some countries  with balance 
of payments  surplus  have sirnilary  resisted  revaluing  their 
currencies  by  trying  to neutralize  the monetary effect of theLr 
surplus.  The Bretton Woods  monetary  system  has therefore 
suffered  by being  too rigid  at times. 
B)  So,  from  1973  onwards,  we went to the  other  extreme  and allowed 
too much  flexibility  by letting the main currencies  float. 
This  solution had been favoured  for a  long  time  by academics. 
They believed that,  if currencies  were allowed  to float, 
then any  surplus or  deficit  in  the balance of  payrnent_s  would 
disappear.  A  rise in the value of a  currency  would  eliminate 
any  surpluses,and  afall  inthevalue  ofacurrency  would 
quickly  remedy  any  deficits.  It would no longer be necessary 
to take  action on the domestic  front.  Monetary  and  budgetary 
policies  would  henceforth  only  be  motivated  by  internal growth 
objectives,  the employment  situation and price stability, 
and not by  balance  of payments  considerations. 
In fact,  over  the past five  years,  there have 
been vast  balance of payments  disequilibria  between industrialised 
nations.  Aside from  the effect of the oil  crisis,  the balance of 
payments  of industrialised countries  have been more influenced 
by  differences  in the growth  rates  at horne than by fluctuating 
exchange  rates. 4. 
This is due to the fact  that the effect of exchange 
rates  changes  on imports  and  exports  is gradual,  while a  boost 
or a  squeeze  on domestic  demand  is spontaneously  reflected  in 
the movement of goods  and  services. 
The development of the Japanese economy  is a 
striking  example  of this.  Despite  the spectacular appreciation 
of the yen,  Japan  has continued to accumulate  a  huge  surplus 
in its  current balance of payments. 
Switzerland,  and to a  lesser extent, 
The same is  true  for 
for Germany. 
At the other  end  of the  scale,  a  country like 
the United States  has seen a  depreciation  in its currency  and 
continues  to register  large  deficits. 
It is therefore  an illusion  to rely solely on exchange 
rate movements  to equilibrate  the balance of payments  and to believe 
that floating  exchange rates  as such  will provide the answer to our 
problems.  An adjustment in the exchange rates  will only  produce 
the desired  effect  if it is accompanied  by internal measures. 
In the case of countries  with a  chronic  deficit  and a  high  rate of 
inflation,  a  currency  depreciation  will only  be effective  if it is 
accompanied  by measures  to control  demand  at home. 
This is what the United  States  is doing  through  budgetary  and 
monetary  policies. 
Moreover,  an appreciation of a  currency  will 
only effectively  reduce  a  balance of payments  surplus  if it goes 
hand in hand  with  expansionist measures  at home.  Without the 
attendant boost at home,  a  currency  appreciation will lead to a 
reduction  in the profits of exporting companies,  a  slowing down 
of the economy,  which,  in turn,  depresses  imports  and once more 
increases  the surplus. 5. 
This is why  the boost  which  Japan and Germany 
have  given  to their economies  go in the right  direction. 
Ideally,  the combined  measures  taken both 
by  countries  with a  surplus  and  countries  with  a  deficit  should 
go a  long way  towards  restoring  their balance  of payments  situations 
and  monetary  stability. 
C)  The  remarks  I  made  earlier  concerning  a  too rigid  application 
of the Bretton Woods  system,  together  with  the obvious  inade-
quacy  of a  monetary  system  which  is too  dependent on exchange 
fluctuations,  as is the case  at present,  leads  us on to consider 
a  third  way  to reform  the  international  monetary  situation. 
1)  On  the one hand,  it seems  obvious  that excessive fluctuations 
in the exchange  rate  upsets  international  trade  and increases 
the mood  of uncertainty  in business  circles.  It is at this level 
that executives  are faced  with the impossible  task  of estimating 
the cost  in their  national  currency  of imported  materials 
to be used  in their  products,  and also calculating  the probable 
income,  again  in their national currency,  of their sales a broad. 
These  large-scale  fluctuations  are one of the causes 
but not the only  one of course  of the present economic crisis. 
2)  On the other hand,  I  think  we must  admit  that it would not be 
realistic  to assume that  in  the foreseeable  future  we could 
revert  to a  world-wide  parity  system.  . The increase in inter-
national  capital  movements  which  has resulted  from the 
general  "internationalisation"  of present-day  economies, 
has  taken  on such  a  dimension  that it makes  an early  return 
to fixed  parities  world-wide  such  as we knew  in the days of 
Bretton  Woods,  extremely  unlikely. 6. 
So,  what sort of reform  do we have in mind  ? 
There are in fact  two  aspects 
a)  The first aspect  of a  gradual return  to greater  international 
monetary  stability  will be  to create  large  stable  monetary 
zones  throughout  the  world,  within  which,  thanks to more 
harmonious  economic  policies,  more stable  exchange 
rates  can be maintained.  Basically,  three main zones 
are envisaged 
a  dollar zone. 
a  European zone,  a  yen zone  and 
At  the European Council meeting  in 
Brussels,  the creation  of a  European monetary zone 
was  decided. 
b)  The second aspect  is an attempt  to reduce  to a  minimum 
exchange rate fluctuations  between  these three zones,  while 
ensuring  a  high  level  of  economic  activity  by implementing 
better coordination of demand  management  policies  between 
the zones,  in particular  where  budgetary  and  monetary 
matters  are  concerned.  We know  monetary  policies 
have a  direct  influence  on the movement of capital, 
and  budgetary  policies  play  a  decisive  part  in determining 
the domestic  demand. 
I  will come back  to this later. 7, 
II.- MOTIVATIONS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  EFFORT 
A  basic  economic  motivation  of the E. M.S.  has been 
dissatisfaction  which  floating  conditions  in the last  few  years  and  the 
conviction  that  this  monetary  situation  was  having  adverse  effects 
on economic  integration  in Europe,  and in general  on growth  and 
employment in the  Community. 
Expressed in a  positive  way,  the basic  objective 
of  the European Monetary  System  (E. M.S.)  is  to contribute  to a  lasting 
improvement  of  the present  economic  growth  and  employment  situation 
of the Community  and  its economic  integration,  thanks  to a  greater 
exchange  rate  stability. 
. .. / ... 8·. 
This objective will be met  only if the system  is conceived 
in such a  way  that it will be durable  and  credible  and  contains neither 
a  deflationary  nor  an infl.ationary  bias. 
1)  Before  explai:n.ing  how it should contribute to more  growth  and  empJ.oyment, 
let me first talk  about  this greater exchanc-e rate stabilitv 
How  can  E. M.S.  help  in this respect  ?  In two  ways 
a)  short term  stability  through  ironing  out  excessive fluctuations  ; 
b)  longer  term  stability  through  fostering  greater  convergence  of the 
economies. 
a)  First,  the European system,  with  its interve::1tion rules  and 
credit mechanism  should 1:e  able  to fight  effectively  the phenomenon 
of overshooting.  By this  I  mean movements  of the exchange rate 
in excess of what  would be warranted  by differences  in inflation rates 
betweea countries. 
occ~rred  in the past. 
This phenomenon  of overshooting  has often 
It can be initiated by  strictly  national causes. 
It can also be initiated  - and it often has been  - by movements 
of third currencies,  particularly  the dollar. 
When people  move  out of the dollar  because there is 
a  lack of confidence  in that currency,  they do :riot move equally  into 
all the Et:ropean currencies.  They often move specifically  to one 
E. E. C.  currency  the  Deutsche  Mark.  This pushes  the  D-Mark up 
and  it  widens  the relationships  between the D -Mark  and the French £:-anc 
or  Sterling.  So,  one can say that  sharp .fluctuations of the dollar 
have  al5o,  in a  certain way,  contributed to  too  sharp fluctua:icns, 
or overshooting,  between European currencies. b) 
jargon, 
Expressing  the  same idea  in the economist• s 
one can say  _e~~~~_nge_ ~c:_~e.:_  __  ?e_~~~e~- large· currencies 
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has  often  been determined  by  portfolio  adjustments.  Such  changes 
have  often  overshoot  the purchasing -power  parity  level  between these 
large  currencies  themselves  and  also  between these currencies  and 
others  which  are less used  as  instruments  for  financial  assets. 
These excessive  movements  tend  to be accomodated 
ex  post  by  price  movements  the more so,  the more  open the 
economies  are,  and  thus  tends  to  exacerbate  inflation  differentials. 
The exchange  rate system,  with its provisions 
for interventions,  and the available ressources  to make 
these interventions,  should contribnte to prevent these overshooting 
movements. 
Longer term stability.·  There is of course a  more fundamental way in which 
the system should contribute to more exchange rate stability.  Participation in 
this system  as  \"Y'e  will emphasize later,  assumes that in the 
adjustment process,  countries will have  to give  a  high priority 
to internal policy measures  rather than to excllange rate changes. 
Otherwise  the effectiveness of the  system itself  would be jeopardized. 
So,  participating countries have to realize  that by adhering to this 
scheme,  they compel themselves  to aim at greater convergence 
of the fundamentals of their economies,  by domestic measures. 
This factor  is sometimes called  t:!:le  discipline 
element of the system,  but this word  might sometimes be misleading 
as it might give  the impression  that adjustr.1ent is only  in a  restrictive 
way  ~.y  deficit cou..r1tries  while adjustment should take place 
in a  symmetrical way. 10. 
2)  Now,  second question,  ho\V  !=hould this greater  excha11~e rate stability 
contribute to higher  growth  and  emplovment  ? 
There are several ways  in which it should do so 
a)  First,  it should allow  a  higher  level  of both  foreign  and  domestic 
demand  to  develop.  Monetary  instability  in Europe  was  felt 
to have a  deflationary  impact  in the following  way.  In some 
countries,  the excessive appreciation  of their  currencies  contributed 
to deflationary  pressures  by  reducing  profits  in export  industries 
&nd  reducing  sale  prospects.  This was one of the causes  of the 
downward  revisions  of  growth  in  Germany  in  1977  and  1973. 
On the other  hand,  in the case of countries whose 
currencies  have depreciated  too  much  in relation to those stronger 
currencies,  this downward  overshooting  has led to inflationary 
pressures  via increased import prices  and  wage indexation. 
These inflationary  implications  act as a  brake in economic revival. 
These countries are afraid  to  -allow--tb.-eir --economy  grow  faster, 
let  this expansion increase pressures on balance  of  payments, 
and cause a  further currency  depreciation and  inflation. 
Greater monetary stability  should have a  positive 
impact  on economic  revival,  it would allow a  higher level  of demand 
to develop.  This would have important multiplier effects  when 
we know  how  open  our economies  are,  and  the high proportion 
ofintra-E.E.C.trade  in  totaltrade.  Trade w·ith other 
E. E. C.  partners  represents  69  '1o  of total Belgian trade, 
between  45  '1o  and  50  '1o  of the trade of France,  Germany,  Denmark 
and  Italy,  and  38  '1o  oi British  trade. b)  Greater monetary  stability  would also encourage  business confidence 
and in../estment.  In talks with European business executives , 
one often hears  complaints  that it is difficult  these days  to give 
their companies  a  full European dimension  because of the ever 
present exchange  risks  and the uncertainty  as to inflation rate. 
It is difficult these days to forecast  correctly  the cost price in 
national currency  of inputs coming from abroad,  or the  revenue 
in national currency  of  exports.  This w1certainty  contributes 
to the fact that  businesses  are not harvesting  the potential benefits 
of a  large market  the size of Europe,  it reinforces also protectionist 
pressures  and  has a  paralyzing .eifec.t  on investment. 
In fact,  one can safely say  that exchange rate 
fluctuations  have managed to replace partly  the ·old customs barriers 
11. 
in their ne gativc  effects  on growth  and the developi:1g  of a large 
European ma!.'ket  and  enterprises  \vith such dimension.  The dismantling 
of customs  barriers  and the progress  towards  integration  was one 
of the elements  of faster  growth  in Europe  in the  1960ties.  The instability 
and  uncertainty  as to exchange rate movements  between Europe  on currencies 
the last few  years  was felt  to act  as a  brake  on integration  and  growth. 
In short,  I  would argue  that  it was  a  situation of 
monetary  instability  in Europe  which  had a  deflationary  bias 
and not the  E. M.S.  design  as  some  have  contended.  I  will come back 
to this later. 12. 
II.- OPER.A.TING  PRINCIPLES  AND  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  SUCCESSFUL 
FUNCTIONING 
Having  analyzed  the economic  motivation  for 
the creation of  E. M.S.,  described  its  contents  in an  Annex, 
.let me now  turn  to the  operating  principles  of  the  E. M.S.  and 
te conditions  for a  successful  functioning  of  it. 
I  would  stress three factors 
the  convergence  of the economies, 
conditions  in the E. M.S.  countries 
of the underlying economic 
that the system  be operated  in a  flexible  enough  way 
a  greater  stability  between  E. M.S.  currencies  and third  currencies. 
1  ).  Converrrcnce  of  the  Economies 
To be successful,  the  EMS  will have· to be 
acc01npanied  by  policies  needed  to achieve a  greater amount  of 
convergence  between the economies  of member states.  The  EMS 
cannot be durable  and effective  unless it is backed  up  by corn:nlerncn-
tary  policies.  .  As there are still important  divergences  in the 
situation of member states,  it will need great  effort  on the part 
of all countries  and in all areas  of nolicy  if the system is to be 
durable. 
Unless  central rate changes  are  going  to be 
very  frequent,  which  would  in itself  limit  the usefulness of the 
EMS,  countries  must  in principle  give  a  high  priority  to internal 
policy  measures  rather  than  to  exchange  rate  changes. a)  Among  these  efforts,  coordination  o£ monetarv policies 
. deserves a  special  role.  It is intended  thereby  to as sure 
a  ·compatibility  of the  internal  monetarv  obiectives of men1ber 
states  with  the  exchange  rate  objectives  and  with  the larger 
economic  objectives. 
In this framework  I  believe  one should 
focus attention  more on the coordination  of domestic components 
of money  creation  on domestic  credit  expansion, 
on one or more measures  of the money  stock. 
rather  than 
J.\: 
T-fti..s  would 
facilitate  the monitoring  of  E. M.S.  if members  would follow 
broadly  the principle  of non  sterilization  through  open market 
operations  or  otherwise,  of their exchange-market  interventions. 
It involves  for coU-Tltries  losing  reserves , 
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letting  the  liouidity  effects  of these losses  to be broadly  reflected 
in a .tighter  money  supply  and  higher  interest  rates.  This was 
already  pratice  for the smaller  countries  in the snake.  Countries 
facing  temporary  accumulation  of  reserves  will also  have to keep 
their cool  and  not  try  to offset quickly  and  completely  the liquidity 
effect  of  sudden  inflows  of  reserves. b)  In this context  of convergence one has also to focus on coordination 
of global  demand  management  Policies.  The efforts  aimed at 
a  concerted  economic  action  decided  in Bremen.  {July  1978) 
I 
and  which  modulated  the  strength  of expans_ion  of countries 
according  the situation  of countries  both  as  regards  balance  of 
payments  and  price  increases, 
of  convergence. 
are also  an important element 
14. 
In this fram.ework  the strongest  economy (Germ~ny) 
toq_k  more  expansionary  measures.  This  _helps also other countries 
to make the necessary  adjustments  and  makes  the whole present context 
more  conducive  to the  right  adjustment  and  convergence  policies. 
I 
This is one of the factors  which  is favourable to the present  functioning 
of the E. M.S .. 
c)  Other  elements  of  domestic  policy- also  have  .an important role-
to play.  In fact,  immediate  issues  affecting  convergence  these 
days  are  in the  area  of  incomes  oolicv.  This is a  question of 
immediate  relevance  in Ireland,  Denmark  and  Italy  wher~::: 
important  wage  negotiations  are  ~eing  discussed.  The outcome 
of these negotiations  '\vill certainly  affect  the  degree  of convcrg~nce. 
The membership  of these  countries  in the  EMS  certainly affects 
the  authorities  position  in  this  area. 
d)  Let me also  make  a  short  comment  here  on the role of the 
diverr!ence  indicator  which  is the main  novelty  in the exchange 
rate  system  and  which  I  have  already  described. 
When  we nroposed  it,  our  purpos~  quite  clearly 
was  not only  to find  a  cornpl.-omise  between  the  two  views  about 
what  to usc  as  the  trigger  of  m.andatory 'int-ervention 
the  parity  grid  or  th~  ECU. 15. 
Our  purpose  what  to find  an obiective  indicator 
as a  trigger  for policy  coordination.  This,  the snake did not 
have,  it did not indicate who  should  take  measures. 
Thus  the divergence  indicator  should  become  one element  of a 
more equilibrated  adjustment  process,  and  should  induce 
convergence  ..  It will be very  important  that all countries make 
this  new  element  function  effectively,  as it could be of a  great 
help  in  fostering  real  convergence.  Its role is to help  signal 
early  in the game  where  divergences  arise  and  induce  countries 
to take  corrective  actions. 
2)  A  second condition  for  successful  operation  is  the necessary 
flexibility  of the system.  \Vhile the E. M.S.  by  itself  should 
contribute  to  reduce  differences  in inflation  rates among countries, 
it should not. prevent  remaining  significant differences  from being 
reflected  in the exchange  rate.  One has to avoid  the rigidity 
of the Bretton Woods  system  and  dedramatize  exchange  rate 
adjustments.  Experience  in the snake  during  the  last three 
years  has been positive  on that  account.  A  number  of adjust-
ments  were  made,  when exchange  markets  were  calm. 
Several  of these  adjustments  involved  a  general  realignment. 
This was  for  instance  the  case  of the  October  1976  snake 
realignment  which  was  a  carefully  planned  readjustment  of 
several  cu:rrencies  which  gave  new  life  to the  snake  when many 
outside  observers  were already  forecasting  its  death. 
In a  sense  the realignment two  years  late:r  was also  a  very 
successful  one.  It was a  kind  of presumptive  strike  which 
anticipated  market  tensions  as one  would  come closer  to the 
January  1  deadline  to  start  the  E. M.S..  This successful 
operation  permitted  the  system  to start in a  quiet  way,  fi:rst 
unofficially  in January,  then  officially  in March. If changes  in exchange  rates  are  kept small 
this  will be an important element  in deterring  speculation. 
Often  one hears  that  speculation  cannot but gain by  the system 
o£  stable  and  adjustable  exchange  rates.  That is not right. 
To the extent  that changes  in central  rates  are  smaller  than 
twice  the  width  of the margin,  it is not sure  at all  that 
16. 
speculation  will gain.  I£  before  the  change  of the central rate 
a  currency  is at the floor  rate,  and after  the change, 
at the ceiling,  speculation  will not have gained,  provided  the 
change  in central  rate  is smaller  than  twice  the margin. 
The  experience  in the snake  has  shown 
that central rates  may  be adjusted  by  as  much  as  4  % 
without affecting  the  market  rate  much,  if a  depreciating 
currency  manages  to  shift position  with  the past strongest 
currency  inside the  regular  E. M.S.  band. 
Some  commentators  of the  E. M.S.  have 
criticized  it  on  the  ground  that it did  not  indicate  clear 
. criteria  for  adjustments  of  central  rates. 
1  would  disazre~  with  this.  If you set specific 
·criteria  about  what should be allowed ,  you will trigger  market force:: 
to push  you to make  those changes.  As soon  as a  country  will move 
towards  the  indicator  speculations will be  t=iggered.  There are 
many  cases  in \Vhich  you  might  want  justifiably  to  resist  a  move 
even if a  sophisticated  indicator  tells  you  something  else. 
1  have oiten mentioned  the  case  of  Belgium  in this respect  \Vhere 
if  we had  :Collowed  indicators  we  would  have been  led to adjust 
in a  more  significant  way  vis -a":"vis  the  DM  in the last  few  years. 
Our policy  of  staying  close  to the  DM  has  allowed  us  on the 
contrary  to  decrease  rapidly  our  inflation  differential  with  Germ2.ny 
which  in  1975  was  still  high  (  7  % )  to less than D_fo  now. This of course  is not to say  that we do not accept 
the role of an objective indicator,  as is evidenced  by  our  initiative 
in p:roposing  the divergence  indicator.  However  this latter  indicator 
can. trigger  different kinds  of  action,  among  which  I  would especially 
emphasize  domestic  policy  actions.  It is true that  adjustment 
in rates  is also  one of the possible  actions  to b3 taken,  but it is 
bv  no means  the only  one. 
Let me now  move  to  a -- third  factor  of stability  for  the  EMS 
17. 
it is not an absolute condition of success  but  it would greatly contribute 
to it  :  a  stable  relation  between  the  dollar  and  European currencies. 
Obviously  this is an element  which  is  to a  large.  extent  outside the 
direct  control  of  Europeans. 
Erratic  movements  of the dollar  have often in 
the past  contributed  to t?e phenomenon  of  "overshooting"  between 
European  currencies .  By this.  I  mean movements  of the exchange rate 
in excess  of  what  would  be  warranted  by  differences  in inflation 1·atcs 
between  countries. 
From  this point of view,  -the  Sn"looth  sta:·t 
of the EM.S  has been hdped  by  the  relative  stability ·of the  dollar. 
This reflects  l:1rgely  the new  and  effective  concern  of the U.S. 
authorities  concerning  the dollar.  It has been manifc st  in monetary 
policies  since  November  1  of last year  c:.nd  also  in budgetary pclicies 
since  then.  Continuation of  such  policies  by  the  U.S.  authorities 
will be helpful  for  EMS. 
In this fra-mework  I  am wondering  whether 
in the future  one  should  not  try  to formalize  somewhat  the effort 
on both  sides  of the ocean  to continue  this  effort  aimed  at  greater 
stability. III. -
18. 
I  am wondering  whether  it  would  not  be feasible 
here  also  to devise  a  kind  of  divergence  indicator  which  should 
induce  the  divergent  country  or  regional  grouping  to take  action. 
This  divergence  indicator  could  be  based  on the  Special  Drawi:::lg 
Right  of-the  I. M. F..  If  the dollar,  the  ECU,  or the Japanese yen, 
diverged  by a  certain  percentage  against  the  S.D. R. , 
this  would  trigger  consultations,  where possible  action by  the 
divergent  country  or  group  would  be  considered. 
OBJECTIONS 
Many  objections have been heard  in the Community 
as  well as  outside  it  vis -a-vis  the  E. M.S ..  I  will deal  with  some 
of  them  realizing  fully  however  that the best  answers  will not come 
reasonings  in abstracto  but rather from the behavior  of the new  system. 
1)  The first and most important objec1i on  lies  in the fact  that the 
economic  situation in Europe  is  too  divergent  as to build up 
a  system  of stable  exchange  rates  among  the  European currencies. 
Those who  raise  this objections  remind us  that the inflation rate 
in the Europe of the Nine  varies  at  the present  between  some 
3  p. c.  in Germany,'-A13  in  Italy. 
This objection should not be easily  dismissed 
but  should be examined  seriously. 
A  part from the fac~  that comparisons  of consumer 
price  indices  are in my view  not the {~  criterion  to measure 
existing  inflation  differentials. 
is  threefold  : 
I  think  the answer  to this objection 
a)  One-must  recognize  the fact  that  exchange mechanisms, 
if they are the only  instrument of coordination,  are  of limited  use. 
It seems to us  to be essential  for the  introduction  of a  system 
which  will stabilize  exchange  rates  to go  hand in hand  with 
effective coordination  of  economic  policies,  in partic"Jlar 
in the sectors  of  internal  monetary  and  budgetary  policies, 
but also incomes policies,  It is not so much a  question of imposing this convergence  from  outside.  I  believe  countries have c orne 
to realize  better  in the last few  years  that  it was  in their own 
interest  to take domestic  measures  towards  convergence. 
They  have all come to realize  that  floating  rates  did  not grant' 
independence  for domestic  policy. 
With  other  words  one can say  quite 
rightly  that those  who  adhere  to the exchange rate system 
should be ready  to adjust  their  internal  monetary  and  economic 
policies  accordingly. 
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b)  The  agreement on  this point  does not imply  that  one should wait 
for a  complete disappearance  of these differences  in inflation rates 
before adhering  to the system.  One  should act to reduce  them, 
but they should not be completely  eliminated  before  the  system 
can become operative.  This system  itself  has a  sufficient 
flexibility  and  it should not prevent  remaining  real disparities 
from being re£lected  in exchange rates. 
\-
:~.../")--._ 
This has happened  withb.  the p-t-.e-s-Emt  snake 
mechanism  which function!!4, well and where remaining divergences 
u,-itre  reflected  in changes  of the exchange rates, 
efficiently  in the last few  years. 
carried out 
c)  Finally,  the  E. M.S.  includes  an element  of supplementary 
flexibility  on behalf  of the Member  States  of the E. E. C. 
which do not participate  in the  snake  in  1978.  These countries 
could  opt  for  wider  margins  (  6  1o  )  around  central  rates. 
As you know,  Italy  has done so. 2)  Another objection partly lin....~ed  with the first one  says that the system 
will necessarily  be deflationary  and  will be  adversely  affecting employment.; 
a)  A  reasoning leading to this conclusion is as follows  the countries 
with a  higher  inflation rate will be forced  to reduce  it  and to adopt 
more  restrictive monetary,  budgetary  and  income policy  which 
will be detrimental to growth. 
We  cannot  agree with  this  objectionto~,4 
really  on what  economists  call 
11the  PHILIPS  curve'' , 
assumption  implying  a  positive  correlation  between growth  rate 
and  price  increases. 
Vfhat it comes down to  is to say  that a  greater 
in...+'lation  is necessary  to a-greater  growth.  This is 
not  the  case .  On the contrary,  in many cases  countries with 
a  low inflation rate,  where confidence  was greater,  have produced 
better ·results  in the matter  of growth. 
British policy  of the past years  has been 
compelled  implicitly  to .recognize  t.'l;,e  error  of this kind of objection. 
OI"'J.y  after introducing  anti-in:flationary monetary,  budgetary  and 
income policy,  has the performance of  the British economy improved. 
\ This is not to say however  that there would not be 
problems  of transition for the poorer E. E. C.  countries  when they 
adhere  to this system,  Demand management policies  might 
Zl. 
be more difficult to apply  in these countries.  It is to meet this kind 
of difficulty  that the problem of transfer of ressources  to these poorer 
countries  has been raised.  This applies especially  for Ireland 
and Italy. 
b)  Another reasoning  holding the same fear  for deflationary  effects 
is as follows  in reality,  the  D -Mark  will draw up  the other 
currencies  above  their  purchasing  power  parity  v:a.lue,  which  will 
will  involve  necessarily  deflationary  effects  through  decre&sed 
competitivity. 
The second objection car...not be met in abstracto. 
It would only be  valid  if one assumes that  the country  wit.h a  strong 
currency  will refuse to take internal measures  in order to ,prevent 
an excessive increase  in the value  of its currency  ar.d  in addition 
will refuse to have  its currency  revalued  with  respect  to other 
currencies  whose economy  had evolved  less favourably. 
One can answer to t.'-lis  that the ECU  divergence indicator  is designed 
to induce countries  whose currency  is diverging  to take the necessary 
domestic measures  in order to prevent the persistance  of divergence. 
On the other hand,  experience of the  snake has already proved  that 
changes  of the central rates  can be carried  out efficiently  and flexibly. 
3)  A  third objection claims  that the European system  will have an inflationary 
bias.  The simplified reasoning  is as follows  the differences  between 
the inflation rates  continue  to exist, ·  great speculations v.ill take place. 
Germany  will be  obliged  to grant  important credits  in order to support 
the weaker currencies ;  these credits will raise the German money supply 
and lead to  high  inflationary  pressures  in that  country. 
An answer to  this cannot be given in abstracto  either. 22. 
This  objection assumes that inflation  differentials 
will remain high  and that adequate changes  in central rates  will be 
resisted. 
Let us  repeat here  that a  major element  of the 
efficient functioning  of the system  will have to be greater effective 
coordination of economic policies  so as to reduce differences  in 
inflation rates.  Let us repeat also  that while the  E. M.S.  itself 
ought to contribute to reducing  divergences  in economic performance 
it should not prevent  remaining  real disparities  from being :reilected 
in exchange rates.  The experience of the snake in  the last few years 
points  that the normal adjustments  have  not been resisted. 
There have  of course been periods  of heavy intervention to fight 
speculation  but these movements have then be reversed  most of the time 
within  a  short  period. 
CONCLUSION 
An imuortant  initiative has been taken  in Euroue 
- -
to move  towards  greater  exchange rate stability.  To function effectively, 
the  E. M.S.  will have to foster  convergence of the economic  situation of 
member  countries  and be operated  in a  flexible  enough  way. 
This movement  should also be seen as an elee1ent 
to bring greater  monetary  stability  at the world wide level.  In this 
context  the continuance  of the recent American efforts  towards a  greater 
relative  dollar  stability  is an important  element. ANNEX 
CONTENTS  OF  THE  E. M.S .. 
The  E. M.S.  agreement  contains  three parts 
an  exchange  system,  the creation of a  European currency  the  ECU, 
and  finally  the  first  steps  towards  a  European Monetary Fund. 
A)  Exchange  system 
1)  g_e_gt_!~..!~~s-~nd .J.nt~~e_gtjp_g_r_El~~ 
Each  currency  has an  ECU-related  central rate. 
These  central rates have been used  to establish  a  grid of bilateral 
exchange  rates  around  which  fluctuation  margins of  +  2, 25 % 
are  established.  E. E. C.  countries  whose·  currencies did not 
belong  to the snake  in December  19 78,  could opt for  wider margins 
up  to  +  6  o/o  at the outset of the.  E. M.S..  Italy  has availed 
itself  of this possibility.  This wider margin should  be gradually 
reduced  as soon as economic conditions permit  to do so. 
1. 
A  Member St~te which  does not participate  in  the 
exchange rate mechanism  at  the outset,  this  is the case of the 
United  Kingdom,  may  participate at a  later  stage. 
Adjustments of central rates  will be subject to 
mutual  agreement  by a  common procedure  which  will comprise 
all countries participating  in the exchange rate mechanism  and 
the Commis.sion.  When the intervention points  defined by  the 
fluctuation margins  are  reached, 
currencies  is  compulsory. 
intervention in participating 
It is also allowed  to intervene before the margins 
are  reached.  In principle,  intervention there also will be made 
in participating  currencies.  But intervention in third currencies 
is not excluded.  The agreement  onE. M.S. ·provides also for 
"coordination  of  exchange  rate policies  vis-a-vis  third  countries 
and  as far as possible,  a  concertation with the monetary authorities 
of these countries. L.. 
One of the new  elements  of the  E. M.S.  compared 
to  the snake  which  involved  only  the parity  grid  system,  is the 
creation in addition of an indicator of  divergence.  It is a  kind of 
warning  system  which  will signal. whether  a  currency  has 
a  different  movement  from the average. 
The indicator  is based  on the spread  observed 
between  the variable  value  of the  ECU  and the  ECU  numeraire. 
It flashes  when  a  currency  eros ses  its  · "threshold  of divergence11 • 
The formula  chosen to calculate this  threshold  is  the following  one 
75  '1o  x  (2,25  %  or  6  %)  x  (1  less the weight of the currency  in the 
ECU  basket). 
This means  that  the  threshold  is set at  75  '7o 
of the  maximum  spread  of divergence  allowed  for  each  currency 
It is calculated  also  in such  a  way  as to 
eliminate  the influence  of the  weight  of each currency  on the proba-
bility  to reach  the  threshold.  If this had  not been done,  currencies 
which  have  a  large  weight  in the  ECU  would reach the divergence 
indicator  later  than other  currencies  since  they  affect  the  ECU 
more  than the currencies  with  smaller  weight. 
Before  you  measure  the  effective  divergence 
compared  to the threshold ,  you  adjust  the effective divergence 
so as  to eliminate  the effect  of movements  of some currencies, 
the  lira  and  the  pound  sterling, in excess of  2, 25  %.  Indeed the lira 
has a  margin  of  6  %  and the  pound  sterling  is subject  to no margin. 
This is done  so that for instance  a  wide  movement  of  the pound Sterling 
would not by itself  lead  a  currency  across its  divergence  threshold. When a  currency  crosses  its  "threshold  of 
divergence••,  this results  in a  presumption  that the  authorities 
concerned  will correct  this  situation  by  adequate  measures  , 
namely  : 
a)  Diversified  intervention 
This means intervention  in  various  currencies 
rather  than  only  in the currency  which  is  furthest  apart 
3. 
from  the currency  of  the  intervening  country.  Diversified 
interventions  allow  a  better  spread  of the burden  of inter-
vention  between  currencies  of  the  E. M.S .. 
This includes  of course  - among others  - measures 
affecting  the  interest  rate  which  have  a  direct  effect  on  the 
flows  of  capital.  In the snake  system  interest  rate move-
ments  were  an important  instrument  to  alleviate  tensions. 
While the  E. M.S.  itself  ought  to contribute 
to reducing  divergences  in economic  performance,  it should 
not prevent  remaining  real  disparities  from  being  reflected 
in exchange  rates. 
This  could  include  for instance  measures  in the 
· field  of  budgetary  policy  or  incomes  policy. In case such  measures  ,  on account  of  special 
circumstances,  are  not taken,  the reasons  for this  shall 
be given  to the other  authorities,  especially  in the 
"concertation  between  Central  Banks".  Consultation will, 
if  necessary,  then  take place  in the appropriate Community 
bodies,  including  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
After  six  months ,  these provisions  shall 
be  reviewed  in the light  of  experience. 
To summarize  this  first  part,  let me say 
that the present  situation  in the exchange  system 
differs  from  the snake  especially  in  the following  way 
a)  membership  has  increased  by  the  inclusion  of the 
French  franc,  the lira  and the  Irish  pound  in addition 
to snake  members ; 
b)  one currency  has a  larger margin 
2,25  % 
6%,  than the 
4. 
c)  the  system  is not only  based  on parity  grid  but contains 
also  a  new  element  the divergence  indicator. B)  The  ECU  and  its  functions 
A  EUROPEAN  CURRENCY  UNIT  (ECU) 
is at  the  center  of  the  E. M.S ..  The value and the composition 
of  the  E CU  is  identical  with  the  definition of the  European Unit 
of  Account. 
The relative  weights  of the currencies  in  the 
ECU  was the following  in  early  March  : 
Deutsche  Mark  33,02  % 
French  franc  19,89 
Pound  Sterling  13,25 
Dutch gulde r  10,56 
Italian  lira  9,58 
Belgian  franc  9,23 
Danish  kroner  3, 10 
Irish  Pound  1' 11 
Luxemburg  franc  0,35 
The  ECU  will be used 
5. 
a)  as the denominator  (numeraire)  for  the  exchange rate  mechanism 
b)  as  the basis  for  a  divergence  indicator 
c)  as  the demoninator  for operations in both  the intervention and 
the  credit  mechanism 
d)  as  a  means  of  settlement  between  monetary  authorities 
of the  E. C .. 
The  weights  of  currencies  in the  ECU  will 
be  re-examined  and if necessary  revised  within  six  months 
of the entry  into force  of the system  and  thereafter  every  five  years 
or,  on  request,  if  the  weight  of any  currency  has  changed  by  25  o/o. 0. 
Revisions  have  to be mutually  accepted 
they  will,  by  themselves,  not  modify  the external  value 
of the  ECU  O!l  th~~ day  of the change.  They  will be made in line 
with  underlying  economic  criteria. 
To serve as a  means  of  settlement,  an initial 
supply  of  E CU  will be provided  by  FE  COM  against  the deposit  of 
2 0  '1o  of  gold  and  2 0  '1o  of  dollar  reserves  currently  held 
by  Central  Banks. 
This operation  will take  the  form  of specified, 
revolving  SWAP  arrangements.  The deposits  will be valued  in the 
following  way  : 
for  gold,  it will be  the lower  of the two  following prices 
the average of  the price,  convert~d  in  ECU,  noted  each  day 
at the-t:..vo  fiXings~ in London  during  the  last  six  months 
or  the average of the two  fixings  noted  the day before  the last  one 
of the period,  so as to avoid  that the price  used  would  be  above 
the present  market  value  ; 
for  dollar,  the  market  rate  two  days  before  the  date  of  value. 
Every  three  months  when  they  renew  the 
SWAP  arrangements,  Central Banks  will  make the necessary 
adjustments  to maintain  deposits  with  FECOM  corresponding  to 
20 %  at least~ of their reserves.  This will be done  to the extent 
that their  reserves  in  gold  and  dollars  have changed. 
Also the amounts  of  ECUs  issued  will also 
be adjusted  according  to the changes  in  valuation  of  gold  or 
fluctuation  in the exchange  rate. 
A  Member State not participationg in the exchange 
rate mechanism  (the U.K.),  may participate in this initial operation 
on the basis  described  above. 7. 
C)  The European Monetary  Fund  and present credit  mechanisms 
The agreement  of  December  1978  provided 
that 
11We remain firmly  resolved  to  consolidate,  not  later  than two 
''years  after  the start  of the scheme,  into a  final system the provisions 
11and  procedures  thus  created.  This system  will entail  the creation 
11of the  European  Monetary  Fund  as  announced  in the  conclusions 
''of  the  European  Council  meeting  at  Bremen  on  6/7  July  1978, 
11as well  as the full  utilization  of  the  ECU  as  a  reserve  asset 
11and  a  means  of  settlement.  It will be based  on adequate  legislation 
11at the Community  as  well as  the  national  level 11 • 
In the meantime,  present financing  and  credit 
rre chanism  will continue  to exist  and  they  have been adjusted  in the 
following  way 
The very short term financing  facility  of an unlimited amount 
will be continued.  Settlements  will be made  45  days  after 
the end of the month  of intervention  with the possibility  of prolon-
gation  for another  3  months  for  amounts  limited  to the  size of 
debtor  quotas  in the short term monetary  support. 
Under the snake  system,  settlements  had to be made 3 0 days 
after  the end  of month  of  intervention.  We will  see also 
that the debtor  quotas  in the short term monetary support 
which  serve  as  ceiling  for the prolongation  for  three  months 
have been multiplied  by  about  2, 5. 
The existing  credit mechanisms  with  their 
present rules  of application  will be maintained  for the initial phase 
of the E. M.S..  They will be consolidated  into a  single  fund  in the 
final  phase  of  the  E. M  S .. 8. 
The credit mechanisms  will be extended  to an amount 
of  25  billion  ECU  of  effectively  available  credit.  This is about 
2, 5  times  the  previous  amount. 
will be as follows 
The distribution  of this amount 
Short term monetary support 
Medium  term financial assistance 
= 
= 
14  bn  ECU 
11  bn  ECU. 
The short term credit mechanism  extended 
between  Central Banks  were extended  before  for  three  months 
with  the possibility  of a  three months  prolongation.  Under the 
agreement  of  E. M.S.,  the duration of the short term monetary 
support  will be  extended  for another  3  months. 
The substantial, increase  in  the amounts  of 
credit ayailable  and the  extension  in the  duration of some credit 
--
mechanisms,  are  _an important  element  for  strengthening 
the credibility  of  the system  by  providing  tl:e  guarantee to countries 
that in case of need,  large means could be  made available  to them 
to fight  speculative  movements. 